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A Legal Leper
By FRANK SWANCARA*
"The foxes have holes, and the birds of the heaven
have nests; but the Son of man hath not where to lay
his head." Luke 9:58.
With one exception, recent rulings and opinion of the Supreme
Court of the United States show that that tribunal protects the constitutional right of free speech regardless of the character, popularity,
or criminality of the person appealing for protection. Charles Smith,
alone, was told, in effect, that he "hath not where to lay his head"
in any judicial asylum.
Angelo Herndon's case received consideration,' and three of the
Justices would have granted relief. Dirk De Jonge was convicted under
and was able to obtain a
the Criminal Syndicalism Law of Oregon,
2
reversal of the state court's judgment.
In the first of the recent series of cases involving municipal ordinances affecting freedom of speech, where the Supreme Court took
jurisdiction, the victim of city action and state decision was Alma Lovell
who regarded herself as sent "by Jehovah to do his work." She was
convicted in Griffin, Georgia, of the violation of a city ordinance which
prohibited the distribution of "literature of any kind" without a permit.
The evidence was that without a permit she distributed matter in the
nature of religious tracts. The Supreme Court, reversing the state
court, held the ordinance void on its face as abridging freedom of the
press..
At Irvington, New Jersey, Clara Schneider, one of "Jehovah's
Witnesses," called at residences at all hours of the day and night, offering
booklets. She was convicted of the violation of an ordinance which
prohibited "canvassing" and distribution of circulars without a permit
from a police official. The highest court of the state, attempting to
distinguish Lovell v. Griffin, affirmed. The Supreme Court of the
4
United States held the ordinance void as to defendant's conduct. Companion cases were disposed of in the same opinion, the court reversing
a judgment of conviction of Kim Young who had distributed handbills advertising a proposed discussion of the war in Spain, and reversing
the conviction of Harold F. Snyder who had distributed circulars while
acting as a labor picket in Milwaukee. The same opinion reverses the
Massachusetts court which upheld the conviction of two women under
*Of the Denver. Colorado Bar.
'Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U. S. 441.
'De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353.
'Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444.
'Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 60 S. Ct. 146.
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a handbill ordinance. The state tribunal thought itself supported by
Davis v.Massachusetts,5 which apparently held that a city could legislate as it pleases with reference to the use of its streets, particularly as
to who may, and when, use a street for public speaking.
Prior to Lovell v. Griffin, and in 1934, Charles Smith appealed
to the Supreme Court, complaining of an ordinance affecting oral discussion on the streets, but that tribunal only said: "The appeal is dismissed for the want of a substantial federal question."
The "question" was actually the same, practically if not identically, with the
issue involved in the 1939 ordinance cases where the court took juris7
diction "on account of the importance of the question. "
Charles Smith, now editor of The Truth Seeker (N. Y.), undertook publicly to defend the materialistic philosophy of Clarence Darrow
and was, as a result, convicted "of expounding atheism in the street
without ... a permit."
The ordinance did not require a permit where
one sought to speak on other secular topics. The Court of Appeals of
New York upheld the ordinance on the theory that the legislative discrimination was really a valid classification because, it was said, a discussion of Smith's subject might arouse "passion, rancor and malice"
on the part of listeners. The Supreme Court of New Jersey later followed the reasoning of that decision, citing it, in holding that Norman
Thomas could not compel the Director of Public Safety of Jersey City
to issue a permit to hold what would be "a socialist meeting in Journal
Square." 9 The California court used the Smith case as a prop in upholding the ordinance involved in Young v.People.1"
The courts found no other objection to Smith's possible speeches
than that they might arouse "passion, rancor and malice" in his nonagreeing listeners. Countless other persons have irritated, even angered,
hearers, and-were protected either by law or by non-existence of any
applicable law. Moreover, if no "rancor" is produced by an address,
no one objects to its delivery, in which event no constitutional or other
legal protection is needed.
The Special Committee on the Bill of Rights, of the American Bar
Association, as Friends of the Court, filed a brief in the Hague case
and there said:
"So long as the purpose of the meeting is lawful, . . . lawabiding speakers and their supporters should not be deprived of
the great American institution of assemblage in the open air be'167 U. S. 43.
'Smith v. New York, 292 U. S. 606.
'Note, 60 S. Ct. 146, 147.
SPeo. v. Smith, 263 N. Y. 255, 188 N. E. 745.

'Thomas v. Casey, 121 N.J.L. 185, 1 A. 2d 866.
ID

U. S. -

; s.c. 85 P. 2d 231:"

DICTA

83

cause other persons are intolerant and ready to violate the law
against assault and battery. Such a doctrine would mean that a
citizen loses his constitutional rights because his opponent threatens
to commit crimes.
"Surely a speaker ought not to be suppressed because his
opponents propose to use violence. It is they who should suffer
for their lawlessness, not he. Let the threateners be arrested for
assault, or at least put under bonds to keep the peace."
The Jersey City ordinance prohibited any "public assembly" on
a street without a permit from the Director of Public Safety. The
Supreme Court of the United States held this ordinance void on its
face because it provided for previous administrative censorship of the
exercise of the right of speech and assembly in appropriate public places."

Frankfurter, J., took no part in Hague v.C.I.O., possibly because
of former connection with the American Civil Liberties Union, one of
plaintiffs. Butler, J., dissented on the authority of Davis v. Massachusetts. That case had become a stare decisis teat for state courts. The
Supreme Court rightly weaned itself because"The Davis case dammed the flow of a stream of precedents
that had the earmark of giving a reasonable easement of assemblage
in public places."lla

The Davis decision was not wholly bad, for the ordinance there upheld
provided that "no person shall . . .make any public address, discharge
any cannon . . . "except with a permit. In People v. Smith the ordi-

nance singled out only those persons intending to expound "atheism,"
thus making a patent discrimination. That is obviously worse, constitutionally, than an ordinance which only allows, but does not require, administrative discrimination, such as the Jersey City ordinance
which was invoked against C.I.O. speakers. It is bad enough to leave
speakers at the mercy of police "discretion," where officials are impartial,
but it is worse where pressure groups intervene, as they did in Jersey
City, to influence the way in which such discretion is to be exercised,
and worse yet is a legislative fiat, exhibited in Smith's case, which bars
the expression of some ideas, but not of others, in a public place.
The highest tribunal in Massachusetts, mother of the Davis

opinion, recently said: 12
"Freedom of the press is a necessity in our political system.
It must be sedulously guarded against subtle encroachments under
the guise of specious pretexts."
"Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U. S. 496. The brief, above quoted, was filed in
s.c. 101
Fed. 2d
"iaClark,
J. in774.
C.I.O. v. Hague, 25 F. Supp. 127, 151. But a good case, refusing to follow the Davis case, is Anderson v. Tedford (Fla.), 85 So. 673, 10 A.L.R.
1481. As to street speaking cases in general, see notes, 10 A.L.R. 1483 and 25
A.L.R. 114.
"rommonwealth v. Nichols, 18 N. E. 2d 166.
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Less fragrant is the "but" of this judicial cigar, for the Court adds:
"But like other constitutional rights it is subject to reasonable rules formulated to serve the public interest ..."
In spite of aversion to "specious pretexts," Lovell v. Griffin was distinguished and rules were found to uphold the handbill ordinance.
Sacred, and "a necessity," is the right of free speech if it is to be
exercised according to prevailing public opinion or by spokesmen for
a pressure group, but it must be subordinated to "the public interest"
if a lone, unpopular speaker is claiming the right. Courts have had
14
13
solicitude for the rights of the Salvation Army, and for labor pickets,
but in some cases, where a solitary "Socialist" complained, it seems
that they but gave lip-service to free speech in the abstract while administering poison in the concrete.1"
Many state courts had acquired the habit of repeating, parrot-like,
formulas to uphold legislation impairing freedom of speech. One
court would scratch the back of another, that is, approvingly cite or
quote a case in a different state. The opinions often seem like essays
on "the police power," and create sufficient fog to obscure constitutional
rights. No lone agitator, nor speaker for a minority group, should
complain of any court's power to declare legislation unconstitutional,
for oppression has resulted from failure to use such power, and unpopular

minorities will be the chief beneficiaries of the recent Supreme Court
action, reversing state decisions, and disapproving, if not preventing,
"administrative censorship." 16
It might be added, parenthetically, that censorship is not always
enforced by arrest and prosecution. In at least one case it was done
by having the fire department use an engine and-hose to wash a speaker
off the street.ea The New Jersey courts upheld this practice.
1"Chicago v. Trotter, 136 Ill. 430, 26 N. E. 359; Anderson v. Wellington,
(Kan) 19 Pac. 719; In re Garrabad, 54 N. W. 1104.
Peo. v. Harris, 104 Colo. 386. But see City v. Snyder, 230 Wis. 131, 283
N. W. 301; Peo. v. Young, 85 P. 2d 231, both of which had to be reversed by
the U. S. Supreme Court.
"Buffalo v. Till, 182 N. Y. S.418; Fitts v. Atlanta, 121 Ga. 567, 49 S.E.
793; Peo. ex rel. v. Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 133 N. E, 364.
"C.I.O. v. Hague. 25 F. Supp. 127, 150 uses that phrase. Some state courts
recognize that a street-speaking ordinance giving "uncontrolled discretion" to officials
to grant or refuse permits to speak is "unreasonable" and may be void on that account.
Anderson v. Tedford (Fla.). 85 So. 673, 10 A.L.R. 1481: Pound, J., in Peo. ex
rel. v. Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, 133 N. E. 364.
Harwood v. Trembley, 97 N. J. L. 173, 116 A. 430. Here the mayor feared
that a Socialist speaker might debate "the propriety of the World War" and thereby
irritate war veterans whereby "a riot might ensue." The case was lately cited against
Norman Thomas. Thomas v. Casey, 1 Atl. 2d 866. The fire-hose or water-cure
case was also cited against a Communist who distributed circulars on a highway.
Almassi v. Newark, 150 AtI. 217. Same case was also used as a thorn upon reformers issuing pamphlets "which criticized the municipal administration." Coughlin
v. Sullivan, 126 Atl. 177. It was a "see, also," in Coughlin v. Chicago Park Dist.,
4 N. E. 2d 1, 8.
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Plainly the recent Supreme Court decisions in favor of the C.I.O.,
the "Jehovah's Witnesses," and the labor pickets, overrule, among
others, the state decisions against Charles Smith and those against the
Smith's legal efforts and futile appeal have been herein
"Socialists."
discussed to point out, and protest against, judicial non-action possibly
caused by some lone litigant's obscurity or unpopularity.
When it is observed that the Supreme Court gave asylum to Ozie
Powell, alleged rapist, 17 Dirk De Jonge, Communist,' 8 and Joe
Strecker, 9 and several "Jehovah's Witnesses," acknowledging that
each had a federal question, one may well wonder why the court should
have made of the lone Charles Smith a legal leper, giving him a judicial
snub in the form of a fiat that he had no "substantial federal question."
The fact that Smith was an "atheist" should have made no difference,
for Mr. Justice
Holmes had kind words for Rosika Schwimmer, another
"atheist. "2 0 When the Socialist, Thomas F. Doyle, violator of a
street-speaking ordinance, appealed, his 2federal
question was perceived,
1
but a jurisdictional question intervened.
Principles of free speech which Charles Smith, in 1934, offered
to the builders of constitutional law, were brought again by the C. I. 0.,
and its ally pro tern, the A. B. A. Committee, and this time accepted,

as evidence in Hague u. C.I.O.
"The stone which the builders rejected
Is become the head of the corner."
"Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45.

"De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353.
"Kessler v. Strecker, 397 U. S. 22.
'U. S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644, 653. Mrs. Schwimmer was described
as "an absolute atheist" in Macintosh v. U. S., 42 Fed. 2d 845, 849.
"Doyle v. Atwell, 261 U. S. 590.

Petit Jury Dispensed With
Major Goodman, of the Clerk's office, states that the Judges have
voted to dispense with the petit jury for the last two weeks in May,
and for the entire month of November during this year.

Notice to Attorneys
The Secretary's office desires to emphasize as strongly as possible
the absolute necessity that members of the bar associations pay their
dues promptly. There are many members in arrears, and 'it costs
stationery, postage and the time of the officers of the association to continue to check delinquents and send notices. Attorneys are requested
to send in their checks without further delay.
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FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
"The Reach for Power"
Section 11 of the Fair Labor Standards Act provides that the
Administrator or his designated representatives may investigate and
gather data regarding the wages, hours, and other conditions of employment in any industry subject to the Act, and may enter and inspect such
places and such records, question such employees, and investigate such
facts or matters as he may deem necessary to determine whether any
person has violated the statute, or which may aid in the enforcement
thereof.
Recently the new Administrator of the Act announced a more
vigorous enforcement policy that would proceed upon the basis of
routine inspection of employment records. The foregoing section of
the Act, however, has now been challenged as unconstitutional by the
American Newspaper Publishers Association. This Association has
advised its members that compliance with the requests of wage-hour
inspectors for information is "wholly optional with a publisher" in
the absence of the issuance of a formal complaint. Where such a complaint has been issued, the Association adds, the publisher need comply
only in the event a court order has been issued. The Wage and Hour
Division, which administers the Act, takes the position that the Administrator has authority to examine the records of any employer whether
or not there is reason to believe he has violated the provisions of the'
statute. The District Court at Chicago, some weeks ago, upheld the
right of inspectors to examine the records of all employees where a complaint had been issued. This order was directed against the Montgomery
Ward & Co., Incorporated, which thereafter appealed to the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit where the case is now pending.
No case has yet been decided where an inspection was demanded in the
absence of issuance of a complaint. In denying the constitutional
authority to conduct such investigations, the American Newspaper
Publishers Association has invoked the decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco
Company, 264 U. S. 298, wherein a similar power, claimed by the
Federal Trade Commission, was held to be violative both of the spirit
and letter of the Fourth Amendment. In that case the Court per Mr.
Justice Holmes, held that, "It is contrary to the first principles of justice
to allow a search through all the respondents' records, relevant or irrelevant, in the hope that something will turn up."-(N. Y. State Bar
Assn. Lawyer Service Letter, Feb. 21, 1940.)
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CALENDAR OF EVENTS

Ap ril 13 -------------..-------------------------------------------------------L egal In stitute at Pueblo
April 20
------------------------------------------------------Legal Institute at Alamosa (Tentative)
April 24 ......................-Annual Dinner of the Denver Bar Association (Tentative)
April 27 ....................................... Law Day at the University of Colorado- Boulder
April 27 ---.. ----------------------------------------------------Board of Governors Meeting- Boulder
May
-----------------------------------------Legal Institute at Denver on Taxation (Tentative)
May 30-June 1 ------------------------------------ Annual Convention National Lawyers Guild
June 14 .----..-------------------------------.......... .....-----------------------Denver Bar Outing
June 22 --....------.-.--------.------...--- Legal Institute at Glenwood Springs (Tentative)
July 20-21 ------------------------------. Institute on Taxation at Boulder with Bogert.
Powell, Rittenhouse and McGuire as lecturers
September 2 ---------------------------------- Annual Meeting, Commissioners on Uniform Laws
September 9 -------------------------------------------- Annual Meeting American Bar Association
September 27-28 --------------------- Annual Meeting Colorado Bar Association (Tentative)
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Public Relations
of the Bar
By ERSKINE R. MYER*
The public relations of the Bar are important, so important, in
fact, that the matter has been given special consideration by the American
Bar Association and many of the State Bar Associations. Proper
publicity regarding bar activities in the past has been almost wholly
neglected, so much so, in fact, that few realize the vast amount of work
which has been done and the great effort which is being made by
lawyers' organizations to improve the law, and thus to benefit the
public. Individual members of the bar are most usually mentioned in
the public press, either in connection with some political matter or a
spectacular trial. Very little, if any, publicity is given from time to
time to the splendid constructive effort of committees of both state and
national bar associations and to the vast range and scope of these efforts.
This lack of public information has been the subject of investigation
and consideration by joint committees of editors and lawyers, with the
result that the situation in a national sense has been considerably improved, but so far as local bar associations are concerned, in most states,
the condition is far from desirable.
Many suggestions have been made as to the proper sphere of a
publicity committee on State Bar activities. Among other suggestions
which have been made are that the local bar associations encourage
meetings of local bar associations with local associations of medical,
dental, accounting and other recognized groups, in order more fully to
acquaint such groups with the services which the bar association might
extend in matters of public and professional interest, encourage local
bar associations to provide suitable public programs on Constitution
Day and other appropriate holidays, having for their object a better
understanding of the meaning of free government and equal justice
under the law, to promote, in a proper and dignified way, public educational programs covering the history of the profession, the services to
the public by the profession in modern times, the efforts of 'the bar to
improve the administration of justice and to protect and preserve
American institutions, and for these purposes, to establish and maintain
a speakers' bureau to furnish speakers as occasions may require. All
such activities improve the relationship between the public and the Bar.
In Colorado, sufficient legitimate publicity has probably never been
given to the meetings of the State Bar Association and to an accurate
report of the excellent addresses which are so often delivered at the
annual meeting. Moreover, sufficient publicity is rarely given to the
constructive work of committees. not merely for the internal admin*Of Denver, Chairman of the State Bar Committee on Public Relations.
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istration of Bar Association activities, but upon those matters which have
a definite public interest. Wherever possible, advance copies of such
addresses might be obtained and the pertinent parts which are of general
interest to the public might be placed in the hands of editors in sufficient
time so that the addresses themselves might be accurately reported.
This, of course, requires not only painstaking organization in the publicity committee, but also cooperation from all speakers and the press.
To these problems, generally speaking, the committee on publicity
of the Colorado State Bar Association is giving its consideration and
hopes to be able to make, at the next annual meeting, definite recommendations. In the meantime, the committee will attmpt to provide
for the distribution, through the press, of accurate reports of the state
meeting. It has been suggested that local bar associations might well
establish committees of a character similar to that of the State Association, in order that in the local press, matters affecting the standing of
and the interest in the local bar might be stimulated and maintained.
From such a relationship with the public and particularly the local
newspapers, the standing of the profession in the local communities will
doubtless be improved.

Newly Admitted Lawyers Honored at Denver by
Junior Bar
Seventeen of the newly admitted members to the Bar were the
guests at a dinner held Monday, March 1 Ith, at the Albany Hotel
in Denver by the Colorado Junior Bar Conference following their admission before the Supreme Court of Colorado at 4:30 in the afternoon.
This dinner marks the beginning of what the Conference hopes will
be a new procedure, and it is the earnest desire of the Conference to continue honoring the new members of the profession following their admission. Its success was due to the cooperation of the Supreme Court
in postponing the ceremony of admission until a late afternoon hour,
and to the support of the members and officers of the Colorado Bar
Association. With their continued cooperation and support, this affair
will continue to be a semi-annual one:
Present at this dinner, in addition to the newly admitted members
to the Bar, were the Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, William R. Kelly, President of the Colorado Bar Association,
Stanley T. Wallbank; of the National Conference of Bar Examiners,
and Peter Hagner Holme, of the Denver Bar Association. Other distinguished members of the Colorado Bar Association and thirty-five
members of the Conference were also present. Following the dinner,
Hugh Henry, Chairman of the Colorado Junior Bar Conference, and
acting toastmaster, welcomed the newly admitted members of the Bar
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to the profession and spoke birefly about the work of the Colorado
Junior Bar Conference. Peter Holme talked upon those things which
he considered the attributes of a successful lawyer, one of the most important being a "saving sense of humor". Stanley T. Wallbank discussed the work of the National Conference of Bar Examiners and the
difficulties involved in properly examining applicants for admission
to the Bar.
William R. Kelly, President of the Colorado Bar Association, discussed the responsibility of the practicing attorney to the public, by
whose grant he holds a monopoly on the legal profession, and to the
profession itself. He said that he felt this responsibility could be best
upheld by the young attorney, especially to the profession, by joining
those bar associations of which he can become a member and by participating actively in their work.
Chief Justice Benjamin C. Hilliard closed the meeting with an
address in which he pointed out that the job of the practicing attorney
is not a small one to be undertaken lightly, but that, commensurate
with the work involved, the opportunities in the practice of the profession of the law are continually increasing, and are as great as they
have ever been. He said that he felt that the great lawyers in the profession were those who practiced before the Bar and upon whose shoulders the responsibility of actively upholding the dignity and honor of
J. RUFF.
-EDWARD
the profession rested.

Pueblo. and Alamosa Plan Institutes for April. and Law
Day Is Scheduled for That Month
Pueblo will be the site of a Legal Institute to be held by the Pueblo
Bar Association on April 13th, according to an announcement made
by J. Arthur Phelps, Member of the Legal Institutes Committee of
the Colorado Bar Association.
Personal invitations have been sent to all lawyers in the Third,
Fourth, Tenth and Eleventh Judicial Districts, and a general invitation
is extended to all members of the Bar Association.
The Institute and dinner will be held at the Congress Hotel and
will start at 3:00 o'clock, P. M. on Saturday, April 13th. The first
speaker of the afternoon will be J. Glenn Donaldson, State Inheritance
Tax Commissioner, who will discuss "State Inheritance and Gift Tax
Law Administration." He will be followed by Omar E. Garwood, of
Denver, who will speak on "Pre-trial Procedure." The dinner will be
at 6:15 P. M., to be followed by short talks by William R. Kelly,
President of the State Association, and William E. Hutton, of Denver,
Chairman of the Legal Institutes Committee. The evening session will
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be devoted to an address on "Chattel Mortgages" by Louis A. Hellerstein of Denver.
Another institute will be held in Alamosa on April 20th. At the
time Dicta went to press, the local committee was unable to announce
the names and addresses of the speakers.
It is also planned to hold institutes in Denver, Glenwood Springs
and Boulder on dates to be later announced.
The University of Colorado will bold its annual Law Day on
April 27th. According to present plans, as announced by Laurence
DeMuth, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Law School,
the morning session will be devoted to a discussion of practice and procedure before the National Labor Relations Board, and the afternoon
session to practice and procedure before the Workmen's Compensation
Act. A luncheon will be held in the Memorial Building under the
auspices of the student bar association and a dinner that evening under
the sponsorship of the Boulder County Bar Association, at which time
a national figure will address the assemblage. Lawyers attending will
be guests of the University at the Colorado Relays held that afternoon.
It is planned to hold the quarterly meeting of the Board of
Governors at Boulder in conjunction with Law day on April 27th.
The board meeting will commence at 3:00 o'clock in the Memorial
Building and adjourn in time for the Law Day dinner.
The First Judicial District Bar Association in conjunction with
the state bar held an institute at Brighton on March 30th. J. Glenn
Donaldson, of Denver, spoke on inheritance and gift taxes at the afternoon session, and Morrison Shafroth, of Denver, talked about recent
constitutional trends at the evening session. The meeting, which was
well attended, was presided over by Judge Homer Preston, president
of the local association.

Junior Bar Holds Regional Meetings
The Colorado conference of the Junior Bar has scheduled a
luncheon meeting at Pueblo on April 13th in conjuncton with the
legal institute to be held that day. The luncheon meeting will start at
12:30 o'clock and will finish in time for the institute session at three
that afternoon.
The second of the regional meetings to be held in conjunction
with the legal institutes by the Junior Bar Conference took place at
Brighton. Members of the conference met at Ingram's Cafe at noon
and discussed various problems which affected the younger members of
the bar.

FRED E. NEEF Reports the

Current Events of
Bench and Bar
Corporate Trustees in New York Lose Money on This WorkFinding that while a profit is made on executorships a loss is sustained by most New York Banks in handling testamentary and living
trusts, the New York State Bankers Association is sponsoring legislation revising upward the fees to be allowed both corporate and individual trustees. The Association's research indicated that on the average
in large, medium sized and small banks in this state, the cost of administering trusts during the years 1936 and 1937 was from $1.08 to $1.14
on every dollar of revenue.
Bill to ProhibitAdvertising by Patent AttorneysA bill has been introduced in Congress which will prohibit advertising by patent attorneys. This bill was introduced through the
efforts of Jennings Bailey, Jr., Chairman of the legislative committee
of the American Bar's patent law section.
Litigation Between Bar AssociationsIn what may be the first instance in the United States of litigation
between lawyer organizations, a complaint of the Brooklyn Bar Association against the Kings County Bar Association based on the use by the
latter of the words "Bar Association" was held good against demurrer.
Trial of the case on its merits will take place in the near future.
Unified System of Criminal LawA complete blue print for a sound practical and unified system of
criminal law administration is being developed by the American Bar Association section of criminal law.
Minimum Fee ScheduleA minimum fee schedule designed particularly to cover that class
of services which most lawyers now perform without any charge has
been proposed by the Lawyers' Association, of the City of St. Louis.
It is contended that if lawyers know that others will follow the practice
they would not hesitate to make fair charges for their services, particularly if they felt sure that other competent practitioners would fix
a like charge for the same work. Moreover, popular knowledge that
expert -legal advice cannot be had without adequate compensation will
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result in a higher popular estimate of its value, and withal, a greater
respect for and appreciation of the profession.
Trust Busting May Affect Bar AssociationMuch concern is being expressed by lawyers over the recent decision
of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in the medical association
case. The thought is that if the Anti-trust laws are effective to prevent
a restraint by organized medicine on numbers engaging in lawful activities the profession considers unethical, then the same laws might prevent
the organized Bar from disciplining members for providing legal service in a manner not now countenanced by the canons of ethics.
Bill for Damage Claims Against Federal GovernmentA bill has been introduced in Congress which would confer concurrent jurisdiction on the Court of Claims and the District Courts to
entertain suits against the Federal Government for amount up to $7,500,
arising out of property damage or personal injury or death caused by
the negligence of any officer or employee of the government when acting
in the scope of his employment.
Inter-American Bar Association?A resolution was adopted by the American Bar Association at its
meeting in 1937 whereby cooperation with other national bar associations in North and South America was suggested with a view toward
producing uniformity of law in this hemisphere. A meeting has now
been scheduled by the American Bar Association to be held in Washington about May 15, 1940, at which time the presidents or representatives of the Pan-American countries, Canada, and the United
States will sign a constitution ad referendum for the organization of an
Inter-American Bar Association. This undertaking has the unofficial
support of the Department of State.

Gould Speaks at El Paso Meeting
"Practical Tax Problems" were discussed by Albert J. Gould, of
Denver, at a dinner meeting of the El Paso County Bar Association at
the El Paso Club in Colorado Springs.
Mr. Gould discussed practical legal points in connection with
Social Security taxes, Gift and Estate taxes, Capital Stock and Excess
Profits taxes, and Federal and State income taxes, giving special -consideration to recent developments and practical problems which the
average attorney may expect to encounter in his practice.
CHARLES J. SIMON, Correspondent.
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Edward L. Oakes Dies
Edward L. Oakes, of 9301 West 32nd Avenue, Jefferson County,
and a Colorado resident for more than sixty years, died Friday, March
15, 1940, in Colorado General Hospital, following a long illness.
Mr. Oakes was born August 25, 1876, in Worcester, Mass., the
same year Colorado was admitted to the Union. He accompanied his
parents to Colorado when he was a child. Oakesdale community,
southeast of Denver, was named for his father, Mr. J. L. Oakes, a
cattleman.
Edward Oakes was graduated from old East High School, Denver, after attending the old Broadway School here. He studied at
Leland Stanford University and the University of Colorado, and completed his law training at Denver University.
He entered law practice at Telluride, Colorado, becoming county
attorney there. Returning to Denver thirty-five years ago, he practiced
law here, also holding a position as claim agent for the Burlington
railroad, until last December, when he became ill.
Mr. Oakes is survived by his wife, Mrs. Blanche B. Oakes; a son,
Edward L. Oakes, Jr.; and two step-daughters, Misses Betty Morton
and Virginia Oakes.
Funeral services were held at All Saints church on Monday,
March
18, followed by burial at Crown Hill cemetery.

Queer Statutes
In these days of Code Revision, committee members are finding
some mighty queer laws on the statute books. For instance, the Code
Commission of North Dakota found these three:
"In a justice's court the parties may appear and act in person or
by attorney and any person may act as attorney, except a practicing
attorney, or other person occupying the same room in which the justice
has his office ..
" Section 9028 of the 1913 Compiled Laws.
"No hotel, restaurant, dining room, or kitchen shall be used as a
sleeping or dressing room by any employee or other person." Chapter
144 of the 1929 Session Laws, Section 6.
"The board of city commissioners shall have power: 57. To license,
regulate or prohibit the running at large of dogs and injuries and annoyances therefrom and to authorize their summary destruction when
at large contrary to any such prohibition or regulation." Section 3818
of the 1913 Compiled Laws.
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Pre-Trial Conferences Prove Successful in Massachusetts
Experiments with pre-trial procedure in Massachusetts have proved
highly successful, according to the recent report of the Judicial Council
of Massachusetts.
The system was first installed in Suffolk County (Boston) in
1935, and the result has been that it "shortens the trial of cases, and
saves the time of attorneys, witnesses and litigants."
In the period of September, 1938, to July, 1939, 5,043 cases
were docketed. Of this number 2,032 were settled either at the pretrial conference or before trial, as compared with 1,734 cases which were
tried. As a result of a pre-trial hearing 241 cases were either nonsuited,
defaulted or dismissed. The remaining cases (1,036) either had not
been tried or had been continued. In Middlesex County, 582 cases were
pre-tried of which 169 were settled, 87 dismissed, nonsuited or defaulted, and the balance tried. The clerk of the Hampden County
Court reported that "the benefits of pre-trial calls in this county is evidenced by the greater number of settlements which are reported."

New Federal Reference Manual
Of particular interest to attorneys, accountants and many business
men who have occasion to appear before or transact business with the
various administrative agencies of the Federal Government is the new
"Federal Reference Manual" published recently by the National Law
Book Company, Washington, D. C. Written by Theodore W. Graske,
former counsel for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, this compact and completely
indexed and tabulated work provides authoritative information on the
origin, purpose, organization, function, publications and procedure of
all the administrative boards, commissions and departments of the
Federal Government, in addition to the federal courts, Congress and
the White House. The price, which includes a pocket supplement showing the administrative changes made pursuant to the Reorganization
Act, is $8.50.
Harlan Howlett has just been appointed County Secretary of the
Democratic party for Boulder County. Mr. Howlett is associated with
Ralph Newcomer in the practice of law in Boulder.

Supreme Court Decisions
Real Estate; Damages; Reservoirs; Seepage; Parties;Revivor; Judgment.
-No. 14677. Decided March 11, 194 O--ColoradoNational Bank
etc. v. Irvine, et al. District Court, Jefferson County. Hon. S. W.
Johnson, Judge. Affirmed. En Banc.
A. Plaintiffs sued L. for damages to their property reFACTS:
sulting from seepage from a reservoir alleged to have been negligently
constructed and maintained by L. on his adjoining land. L. answered,
denying liability, and as a further defense asserted that D. was the holder
of a Deed of Trust on the plaintiffs' property and consequently was
an essential party to the proceeding.
B. D intervened, and prior to trial L. died. On motion of plaintiffs, alone, an order was entered substituting L.'s executor and executrix
as defendants and they were duly served with process.
C. Jury found issues for plaintiffs and intervener and assessed
the damages. Thereafter plaintiffs assigned to intervener, D., so much
of amount recovered as would pay in full his loans on the premises to
plaintiffs.
D. Thereafter the Court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs
and against defendants, and that intervener take nothing, it being held
that "the loan held by said intervener on the premises of plaintiffs is
sufficiently secured to protect him against loss."
1. The contention of the defendants that the trial court
HELD:
erred in permitting the cause to proceed to trial and allowing the intervener to seek judgment against defendants because of the failure of intervener, individually, to move for a revivor is without merit.
2. The action did not abate by reason of L.'s death, but merely
remained in abeyance until the decedent's legal representatives were substituted as parties defendant.
3. While until such legal representatives were made parties they
were not required to take notice of the action, when such substitutiQn of
parties is made, and the legal representatives appear in the action, there
is no valid rason why an intervener therein, who supports the side of
the party bringing about the revival and who originally intervened at
the behest of the adverse party, should be required separately to additionally move for a revivor as a condition precedent to the final adjudication of the mutual controversy with the common adversary.
4. Defendants may not object to entry of judgment in favor of
plaintiffs alone, excluding intervener, where there can be no second
recovery for the same injuries.
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5. "Where permanent injury to land is alleged but one cause of
action is constituted and all the damages must be assessed in that proceeding. There can be no second recovery where permanent damages
have been so assessed."
6. Although the amount of the intervener's lien on plaintiffs'
property was $8,793.24, and the damages assessed by the jury were
$9,666.66, and the value of the property, as alleged by plaintiffs and
intervener, was only $15,000.00, the supposition that the damages
awarded were excessive is not warranted. The Court's finding that the
loan held by the intervener was sufficiently secured to protect him from
loss was undoubtedly based upon the consideration that the indebtedness was secured by the trust deed on the land as well as by the-partial
assignment of the damages.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Young, Mr. Justice
Bock and Mr. Justice Burke concur. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bouck dissent. Mr. Justice Bakke not participating.

Labor; Unions; Pickets; Transportation; Injunction; Contracts; Secondary Boycott.-No. 14671. Decided March 18, 1940-Denver
Local Union No. 13, et at. v. Perry Truck Lines, Inc., et al. District Court, Denver. Hon. Henry A. Hicks, Judge. Reversed. En
Banc.
FACTS: A. Suit by an employer, operating two truck transportation agencies, joined with eight employees to restrain defendants
from placing a picket of any kind on or near any Property of employer,
or from picketing any operation of the employer, or interfering with
shipments handled by employer, or intimidating customers, or refusing
to handle interline freight transported by employer, or boycotting employer, or conspiring against or in any manner interfering with rights
of employees of said employer to work unmolested, etc.
B. The trial court issued an ex parte temporary restraining order,
and later graihted a permanent injunction against the defendants.
HELD:
1. "The record does not disclose any force, or violence,
or any intimidation and threats thereof, an the part of the defendants:
nor is there any showing of fraud."
2. "* * * Force and violence by employees, or any organization
thereof, never can be sanctioned, and * * * orderly government cannotexist unless such force and violence, if indulged in, be suppressed by
the regularly constituted governmental agency. It is conceded that an
employer has a legal right to maintain a nonunion business, and that his
employees have a right not to join a union."
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3. A labor organization may peacefully picket one whose employees are not members of such organization.
4. A "labor dispute" under the terms of Section 87 (c), Chapter
97, '35 C.S.A. (commonly called State Norris-La Guardia Act) may
exist "regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee."
5. Even assuming that the sole object of the union was to compel
the employer to coerce his employees to join a labor union (to obtain
a closed shop) there is no merit to the argument that such differences
between employer and union do not amount to a "labor dispute."
6. One purpose of the state act is to permit the employee to become and remain a member of a labor organization even should the
employer succeed in making the employee enter into a "yellow dog"
contract.
7. It is not illegal for an employer and a labor union to enter
into an agreement whereby employer agreed to employ union men only.
8. Economic loss sustained by an employer because of the lawful
exercise of peaceful picketing is not recoverable.
9. The union could legally notify customers of the employer
transportation company of the picketing against the employer.
10. When members of a picketing union urge customers of
employer or others in unity of interest with the union not to utilize
plaintiff's transportation agency, this is a legal "material" boycott and
not an illegal secondary boycott.
11.
Where it is found that peaceful picketing was not wrongful,
a difference of opinion between union and employer about "fairness"
or "unfairness" is too shadowy or unsubstantial to require repression
by a court of equity merely because the pickets carried placards declaring, "This Firm Unfair to Teamsters Local Union No. 13."
12. The provision of the act, providing that in labor disputes
certain conduct dealing with rights, obligations and defenses of persons, as a matter of substantive law, shall not be subject to the harsh
remedy of injunctive repression, is not unconstitutional.
13. Acts of defendant union representative examined and found
not to have violated trial court's temporary restraining order; therefore
it was beyond jurisdiction of trial court to impose punishment for contempt.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Otto Bock. Mr. Justice Burke dissents.
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Ejectment.-No. 14602. Decided March 4, 1940-French, et al. V.

Golston. District Court, Hinsdale County. Hon. George W. Bruce,
Judge. On rehearing. Reversed with directions. En Banc.
FACTS: A. G., alleging fee title in himself, brought ejectment
against F. to recover possession of Roxy lode.
B. F. answered, admitting possession, denying other allegations;
and asserted title in himself by (1) eighteen years adverse possession,
(2) seven years claim and color of title with payment of taxes, and (3)
by assignment of squatter's right.

The reply denied all new matter.

C. The court found generally for G. and held that the tax deed
under which he claimed conveyed the fee, that the defenses were without
merit, and entered a decree in G.'s favor for possession.
D. History of title: In 1896, mining company filed a location
certificate on the Roxy lode, and in 1897 executed a lease to C. for
that part of land then enclosed by C. "during her ownership or occupancy of said house and stable." In 1898, company received a patent
to the Roxy lode. In 1917, B. and S. took out a tax deed on the property and the same year transferred it to H., B. and T. by warranty deed.
In 1917, C. quit-claimed to F. "all the buildings and improvements ...
(leased by the company to C.)

. . . running for a term" of 99 years

together with all her rights and privileges under her lease from the
company. The land and improvements were sometimes separately assessed. In 1924, the improvements were sold to the county and Certificate #5005 issued therefor. In 1930, the land was struck off to the
county and Certificate #6227 issued therefor. In 1936, the county
commissioners authorized the treasurer to assign the certificates for a
minimum sum of $500.00. In 1937, one McG., holder of a prior tax
sale certificate, acting through a daughter of F., redeemed in McG.'s name
from the sale evidenced by Certificate #6227, and received from the
treasurer a redemption certificate to that effect. A week later the treasurer
wrote McG. that this redemption certificate "was erroneously issued as
only owners can redeem," and informed him that he was holding the
money paid for the redemption certificate for him. McG. never called
for the money. The next day the treasurer issued to G., the tax deed
under which he brings this suit. It is based solely upon Certificate
#6227, and specifies only the price appearing on its face, i.e., $19.56,
plus subsequent -taxes, $16.44. F. had been in possession of some of
the improvements on the property for more than 18 years, and had
erected improvements thereon costing $20,000.00. F. had never paid
any taxes on the land, and had paid no taxes on the improvements since
1925.
HELD: 1. "It is fundamental that a plaintiff in ejectment must
recover, if at all, on the strength of his own title and not upon the weak-
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ness of that of his adversary." "Title in a third person is therefore
generally a good defense."
2. "Possession implies ownership until the contrary is shown
and prior possession is sufficient against a mere intruder."
3. "The defense of title in a third person is not available to a mere
intruder."
4. G.'s tax deed was invalid because one, T., had a treasurer's
deed to one-third of the property dated 1922 and duly recorded. T.
was not notified, and no sufficient reason appears for that failure. The
statute requires notice to all persons "having an interest or title of
record."
5.
G.'s tax deed was invalid for the additional reason that the
very certificate upon which G.'s deed was issued had been redeemed by
McG., holder of a former certificate. "He probably had a right to
redeem."
6. While the redemption certificate to McG. was outstanding the
treasurer was powerless to issue a deed.
7. McG. "was entitled to be heard, and, doubtless, if his redemption was cancelled, to reimbursement."
8. Before F., (a defendant in an ejectment suit) could take any
advantage of G.'s title, he was bound to show that he was no mere intruder. When F. put in evidence his possession, claims and improvements, plus the quit-claim deed and lease, ineffective as these were to
establish title, he clearly establishd his right to put G. on proof.
9.
The trial court found that F. held no such exclusive and adverse possession as is required to support the statute. His failure to pay
taxes defeated F.'s claims under the seven year statute. F. made no
serious attempt, and could make none, to support his claim to squatter's
right on public domain because the property was patented and that
patent had been of record for nearly twenty years before F. obtained
the assignment of the alleged interest of C.
10. Separate assessment, sale and certificate as to land and improvements was invalid and the two must be considered as one. "Hence
one who assumed to pay taxes solely on the improvements or solely on
the land was merely paying a part of the total tax on the real estate."
11.
While ejectment is, primarily, a legal action and concerns
itself only with legal titles (but neither party has shown legal title to
the Roxy.lode) the contrary is the rule in this jurisdiction.
12. An unqualified judgment for F. would relegate G. to a
statutory action to quiet title, which being out of possession, he could
not maintain, and his investment would inure to the benefit of F. who
has neither legal nor equitable claim thereon.
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13. An unqualified judgment for G. would, on the strength of
a bad tax deed, permit him to oust F. from long possession and seize
improvements worth many times his investment.
14. Having blundered in securing his tax deed, G. can have no
cause of complaint if he be made whole. Having long occupied the
premises without title, F. can have no cause of complaint if-he is obliged
to carry the tax burden which title would impose.
15. Judgment is therefore reversed with directions to the trial
court to ascertain the amount paid by.G., with statutory interest, and
enter judgment in his favor for possession, unless F., on or before sixty
days from the date thereof, shall pay said sum into court for G., in
which event the action shall be dismissed at F.'s costs.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.

Trust Agreement; Succession Tax: Constitutional Law; Pleading.No. 14434. Decided March 4, 1940-Miliken, etc. v. People.
County Court, Denver. Hon. C. E. Kettering, Judge. Affirmed in
part and remanded with directions. En Banc.
HELD:
1. Where it appears that before a grantee. under a
trust indenture, could obtain possession and enjoyment of the corpus
of the trust estate "as an individual", the death of the grantor is a necessary and indispensable precedent, the imposition of the state transfer
tax under Sec. 7 (d) Chapter 85, '35 C.S.A., is justifiable.
2. "The succession tax is one imposed on the privilege of receiving property-it is not laid on the donor but on the beneficiary."
3.
"The objective of the legislature in passing the succession tax
act was to prevent evasion of inheritance tax."
4. "The conveyance of the corpus of the estate under the trust
indenture was a 'transfer' of an interest in property within the meaning
of Section 3, Chapter 85, '35 C.S.A. Formal distinctions pertaining
to the law of real property, such as contingent and vested remainders
and the various niceties of the art of conveyancing are irrelevant criteria
in this field of taxation."
5.
"When there is a written opinion it serves as a precedent only
on the point decided: hence, an affirmance without written opinion
can not be considered by us as a precedent in subsequent litigation."
6. The title of the act does-not contain more than one subject,
and therefore the act is not unconstitutional on such ground.
7. The issues were made by the inheritance tax commissioner's
report to the county court, the entry of an order thereon fixing the tax,
giving notice to all interested parties, and the filing of written objections
to the assessment. Under this procedure, there is no implied admission
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of any fact in the objections, and it is not necessary for the state to
deny the new matter presented by the written objections.
8, If the grantee under the indenture contributed a sum of money
to the estate from her personal funds, which was reflected in the corpus
of the estate as of the date of death of the grantor, "it may be that she
is entitled to have that sum considered in the valuation of the property
transferred as of that time. Without expressing an opinion on this
issue, we deem it of sufficient importance to require the trial court to
hear, determine and make findings thereon."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard not participating. Mr. Justice Bouck concurs in the remanding and dissents
from the affirmance. Mr. Justice Young dissents.

Insurance; Automobiles; Election of Company to Repair Auto Rather
Than Pay Estimated Damages Under Collision Policy; Dismissal
of Suit for Damages Where Owner Refuses to Permit Insurance
Company to Repair Car. No. 14479. Decided February 5, 1940Home Mutual Insurance Co. of Iowa vs. Stewart. County Court,
Larimer County. Hon. Arthur E. March, Judge. Reversed. In
Department.
HELD:
1. Where, under a collision or upset insurance policy,
plaintiff's car is damaged and four bids are obtained, for repairing the
car, ranging from $175.00 to $320.00 and the insurance company within a reasonable length of time elects to repair the car rather than to pay
for the damages, where the policy so provides, the plaintiff may not
have the car repaired by a mechanic of his own choice, pay the highest
amount and then recover same from insurance company.
2. Insurance company's notice of election was made within a
reasonable time (19 days from accident); it was clear, positive, distinct, and unambiguous.
3. There can be no issue as to whether the repairs were suitable
or adequate until after the repairs are made, and the plaintiff never gave
the company a chance to make the repairs.
4. It would not be justice for the court to dismiss the plaintiff's
case merely because he had his car repaired and refused to permit the
company to do so after it had so elected where it appears that plaintiff
was actually damaged and that the company admits that it would have
cost $175.00 based upon the lowest bid obtained by it in good faith.
Plaintiff to recover $175.00 but to pay costs.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bouck concur.
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Quiet Title; Restrictions; Agreement Not to Sell or Lease to or Permit
Occupancy of Real Estate by Colored Persons. No. 14441. Decided
January 22, 1940-Steward v. Cronanet al. District Court, Denver. Hon. Otto Bock, Judge. Affirmed. En Banc.
FACTS:
A. Plaintiff, a colored person, sought to quiet title to
certain real estate in Denver on which he held a purchase contract obtained from the widow of one of the covenantors, and to avoid a certain restriction agreement under which persons of his race were prohibited from occupying premises in the restricted area.
B. All the property owners who were parties to the agreement
were made parties defendant, but only two of them answered. Plaintiff demurred to the answer; the demurrer was overruled: he elected to
stand thereon; and judgment was entered against him. The trial court
refused to enter default against the non-appearing defendants, and did
enter judgment in favor of appearing defendants.
C. The restriction clause is as follows:
"The undersigned for themselves and their heirs and assigns
covenant and agree not to sell or lease the said above described lots or
parcels of land owned by them respectively or any part thereof, to any
colored person or persons, and covenant and agree not to permit any
colored person or persons to occupy said premises during the period from
this date to January 1, 1941."
1. The restriction agreement is valid.
HELD:
2. The case of Chandler v. Siegler, 88 Colo. 1, 291 Pac. 822, is
not "obiter dictum" as applied to the facts of this case, and is the law.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice not participating.

Taxes; Mandamus to Compel Treasurer to Issue Certificate of Redemption for Lands Sold for Taxes. No. 14676. Decided February 5,
1940-TarabinoReal Estate Co. v. Dunlavy, etc. District Court,
Las Animas County. Hon. John L. East, Judge. Affirmed. In Department.
A. Company was fee owner of land sold for non-payFACTS:
ment of 1932 taxes. 'The certificate was assigned to C in July, 1939,
for $2,784.39. Had C paid the full face amount all the taxes, the
total would have been $3,847.51.
B. On Sept. 6, 1939, the company tendered the treasurer the
exact amount of C's payment, with statutory interest, etc., and demanded its certificate of redemption. The treasurer refused, claiming
the company must tender the full $3,847.51. The company brought
mandamus. The lower court sustained a demurrer to the alternative

writ.
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HELD: 1. The owner of the real estate must pay to the treasurer
the full amount demanded by him for the redemption, and may not
redeem by paying only what was paid by the purchaser of the certificate.
2.
"A certificate for land struck off to the county for failure
of bidders at the sale is issued by the treasurer to the county and subsequent taxes are endorsed thereon. Thereafter no taxes are payable until
redemption or sale."
"Such certificates may be sold by the treasurer
for the amount for which the land was struck off to the county, with
interest and penalties, or 'for such sum as the board of county commissioners . .

.

. may decide and authorize.' "

3.
The statute provides for redemption by payment to the treasurer, for the purchaser, of "the amount for which the certificate was
sold, plus interest, together with the amount of all taxes accruing on
such real estate after the sale, paid by the purchaser and endorsed on his
certificate of purchase. "To redeem the owner must refund taxes paid,
not money paid."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bock concur.

Workmen's Compensation; Dependents. No. 14666. Decided February 5, 1940-Regal Coal Co. et at. v. Jackvich. District Court,
Denver. Hon. George F. Dunklee, Judge. Reversed. In Department.
HELD:
1. Evidence as to. dependency of claimant upon deceased, examined and found to properly sustain commission's finding of
no dependency.
2.
"If the testimony on which claimant relied to establish dependency and on which the commission made a finding of no dependency was such that honest men fairly considering it might arrive at contrary conclusions, then an issue of fact was thereby presented and the
finding of the commission on that issue was binding on the district
court in its subsequent hearing of the case, and binds us on review."
3. The dependency of a sister is a question of fact.
4. The commission is a fact-finding body and as such is the sole
judge. of the credibility of the witnesses.
5.
Even though the testimony of a witness as to certain facts
may be uncontroverted by other direct testimony, it does not follow
that the facts testified to, as a matter of law, must be accepted as uncontroverted facts.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
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Criminal Law; Larceny; Evidence; Conversations;Hearsay. No. 14610.
Decided January 1, 1940. McPhee v. People. District Court, Denver. Hon. Stanley H. Johnson, Judge. Reversed. En Banc.
HELD:. 1. In a criminal action in which the defendant is being
prosecuted under a charge of larceny of an automobile, it was error for
the trial court, over defendant's objections and exceptions, to permit
the introduction into evidence of conversations between a co-conspirator
and a police officer, where such conversations did not take place in the
presence of the defendant.
2. The statements made by co-conspirator to the police officer
could not have been in furtherance of the conspiracy; in fact they were
in derogation of it, and were, therefore, not admissible against a defendant, out of whose presence they were made.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Justice Young, Mr. Justice
Bakke and Mr. Justice Burke dissent.

Criminal Law; Needlessly Killing Dogs; Statutory Construction. No.
14692. Decided January 22, 1940-Failing v. People. County
Court, Park County. Hon. Clarence S. Bullock, Judge. Reversed.
En Banc.
FACTS: Defendant convicted of needlessly killing dogs. He contended dogs were worrying cattle on his land although he owned neither
dogs nor cattle.
HELD: 1. In 1864, territorial legislature made it "lawful for
any person, at any time, to kill any dog which may be found running,
worrying, or injuring sheep." In 1872 it was made unlawful to needlessly kill any living creature. In 1877 the law was changed to include permission to kill dogs when found running, worrying or injuring cattle.
2. The people's contention that the needless killing of a dog is
prohibited even though such dog may be running or worrying cattle, and
that the defendant could have used a stick or fired a warning shot and
scared the dogs, is not tenable. No limitations are found in the statute,
and there is no question of malicious killing.
3. Where a criminal statute admits of two constructions, "that
which is more favorable to the defendant is to be preferred."
4. Where it appears that the dogs were barking at the cattle,
which were ten or fifteen feet away from them, and the cattle were facing the dogs with their heads down, this constituted "worrying" within
the meaning of the statute.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock.
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DICTA

Criminal Law; Statutory Rape; Evidence; Letters; Reopening Case. No.
14688. Decided February 5, 1940-Monchego v. People. District
Court, Costilla County. Hon. John I. Palmer, Judge. Affirmed.
In Department.
HELD:
1. In a criminal case where defendant is charged with
statutory rape, it is not prejudicial error to admit in evidence a letter
from accused to prosecuting witness, showing their relations, where the
time involved was May, 1937, and the letter is dated January, 1937,
particularly where the evidence shows that it was written at a time when
they were closely associated.
2. No court can positively say that the time element alone is
controlling in such situations.
3. It was not error for trial court to permit the district attorney
to reopen the people's case after resting, for the purpose of showing
the defendant's age.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke.
Mr. Justice Burke concur.

Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
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Why should I advise my clients to invest in
INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT CERTIFICATES?

A. For FIVE IMPORTANT reasons.. ....
.................
Investors who study the possibilities of investment accounts at Industrial find
they offer (1) a superior type of security; (2) an income yield more attractive
than offered by Government Bonds and other highest type securities; (3)
management record and policies distinguished for their soundness;. (4) a very
high degree of safety without market fluctuation; (5) availability of funds
through usual withdrawal privileges.
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